Intelligence Analysis of Transnational Crime: Assessing Canadian Preparedness by Stewart, James G.
Vol. XVI No. 1, Spring 1996 
Intelligence Analysis of Transnational Crime: Assessing Canadian 
Preparedness 
by James G. Stewart 
James G. Stewart is a Criminal Intelligence Analyst with the Coordinated Law 
Enforcement Unit of British Columbia's Ministry of the Attorney General.  
INTRODUCTION  
Over the past twenty five-years, much has been written in Canada on the subject of 
security intelligence, but unfortunately, much less on the subject of criminal intelligence. 
Security intelligence has undoubtedly been subject to greater scrutiny and interest by 
virtue of certain espionage and even criminal events that have given rise to royal 
commissions and parliamentary hearings.1 Writings and studies by journalists, academics 
and other researchers have examined in considerable detail the mandate, role, 
responsibilities, duties, effectiveness and accountability of security intelligence agencies.2 
Although all might not agree, the standard of efficiency and effectiveness of those 
security intelligence agencies has probably increased significantly as a result of the 
scrutiny and various recommendations flowing from the commissions and hearings. 
Criminal intelligence, however, has not been subjected to such scrutiny and it might be 
argued that it is all the worse for that.  
It has been suggested that there are fundamental differences between a system established 
for the enforcement of the law and one for the protection of national security. The federal 
government presented that view in a submission before the Special Committee of the 
Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on 7 July 1983.3 A contrary 
submission, made on 3 October 1983 by the Minister of Justice for Saskatchewan stated:  
We do not necessarily agree with . . . [the] submission concerning the primary objective 
of a law enforcement agency. We suggest that a primary purpose of any law enforcement 
agency is to prevent offences from happening and thereby maintain law and order 
throughout the country. A security agency has a similar role in having as its primary 
objective, a responsibility to ensure that the security of the country is maintained and not 
subverted by others.4
But the accentuation of the "fundamental" differences between the two "systems" 
prevailed from that point on. It is suggested that the early proponents of the 
"fundamental" differences view may have been some senior RCMP Security Service 
officers whose frustration with internal RCMP policy with respect to communication 
with the Solicitor General on matters of security and intelligence, emphasized certain 
differences, rather than accentuating similarities, as a means of seeking a new identity for 
the Security Service, entirely separate from the RCMP.  
The distinction between the two "systems" was emphasized by the findings of the 
McDonald Commission, as well as the Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Not surprisingly, the subsequent Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service Act (1984), at least in the public view, confirmed those 
apparent differences. Otherwise why would security and intelligence work not continue 
to be conducted within the framework of the RCMP?  
Although the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) has commented on the 
relationship between CSIS and the RCMP, particularly in the area of terrorism and their 
cooperation and sharing of information,5 it is unfortunate that SIRC has not sought to 
increase its knowledge and understanding of the more intricate aspects of law 
enforcement and particularly the field of criminal intelligence. However, this topic 
probably lies outside its mandate. Following SIRC's Third Annual Report which, inter 
alia, raised concerns about the effect CSIS' counter-subversion operations were having on 
civil liberties, the federal Solicitor General responded by establishing an Independent 
Advisory Team (IAT) in July 1987. In its report the IAT was yet another official body to 
declare that certain "fundamental differences" existed between police work and security 
intelligence work.6 Given all these authoritative pronouncements it is little wonder that 
the differences were almost "cast in stone." Stuart Farson put it well when he stated:  
[I]n fact, it has now become almost second nature to conclude that there is a marked 
difference between the security intelligence role provided by CSIS and that provided by 
the police.7
Law enforcement traditionally has been considered by many to be essentially reactive. 
Although there has been an element of information and prevention in law enforcement, 
on the whole it takes place after the commission of a distinct criminal offence and might 
be deemed "result oriented," emphasizing apprehension and adjudication. Only recently 
have police executives looked to strategies such as "Problem Oriented Policing," which 
focus on eliminating causative elements of crime and are preventive in nature.  
On the other hand security intelligence seeks advance warning and the forecasting of 
possible security threats not necessarily concerned with breaches of the law and might be 
considered more "information oriented." But, in fact, since at least 1956 law enforcement 
has been involved in the collection, filing and sometimes analysis of criminal intelligence 
at the local, national and international levels, in order to identify major criminals and 
criminal groupings. Nevertheless, owing to a lack of interest on the part of journalists, 
academics and other researchers, and a corresponding lack of openness on the part of 
police forces and departments, the field of criminal intelligence studies has not 
progressed as far as it might have.  
In fact, there may be far more similarities than differences between the fundamental 
processes involved in the production of both criminal intelligence and security 
intelligence. Professor J.Ll.J. Edwards, in a study paper prepared for the 1981 McDonald 
Commission report stated:  
it is difficult to see where any theoretical or jurisdictional line can properly be drawn, on 
the one hand, between the criminal intelligence activities of the ordinary police, as part of 
the national intelligence police system and on the other, the domestic intelligence 
gathering activities of the Security Service Branch of the federal police.8
Although there may not be a theoretical line between the two activities, the general 
perception of the police role in society is probably mainly a reactive one of law 
enforcement which is reinforced by daily media coverage of arrests and court 
proceedings in their communities. Yet, through community based programs such as the 
Block Watch and Neighbourhood Watch programs the public is involved, along with the 
police, in a participatory role in preventing criminal activities. The prevention of criminal 
acts, be it terrorism or any one of the myriad of others in the Criminal Code, is still the 
main raison d'etre of a modern day police force. Preventive measures must be undertaken 
to preserve the peace, which should include substantial proactive intelligence operations 
against sophisticated organized criminals.  
THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS 
One of the essential tools in that prevention process is an effective criminal intelligence 
organization. Like its security intelligence counterparts, a criminal intelligence 
organization must also have a process of systematic collection, collation, evaluation, 
analysis and dissemination of information from a wide variety of sources in order to 
identify criminal endeavors and prepare threat assessments before events occur.9  
Although the end users or customers of the criminal and security intelligence may be 
different in each organization, the basic information processing concepts are very similar. 
There are differences in certain policy and procedural matters between security and 
criminal investigations, such as the method for the acquisition of warrants for 
telecommunication intercepts. The security organization, being federally controlled, must 
first receive approval from the Solicitor General of Canada and then make application to 
the Federal Court of Canada in Ottawa. Under the Constitution Act (1982), although the 
federal government of Canada is responsible for enacting criminal law, it is the provinces 
that are responsible for its administration and enforcement. Thus, in making application 
for a telecommunication warrant in a criminal investigation the police are required to 
seek authority through provincial judicial bodies. Yet, the grounds for seeking the 
authority for a communication intercept are quite similar in both fields of investigation, 
i.e., that other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or that it appears 
that they are unlikely to succeed, and that the urgency of the matter is such that it would 
be impractical to carry out the investigation using only other investigative procedures.  
Many of the interviewing concepts, investigative methods and techniques in both security 
and criminal investigations have parallels. Each may have very complex investigational 
processes, requiring considerable tact, investigative skill, sensitivity and acumen. The 
McDonald Commission report itself makes it evident that practically all basic 
investigative practices were common to both the regular and security duties of the force.10 
The degree of judgement required of employees in security and criminal investigative 
bodies depends a great deal on the type of work being performed and the level of 
seniority and experience of the employees.11 Unfortunately, the field of criminal 
intelligence has not been entirely understood even within domestic and foreign police 
agencies.12 Heretofore, it has not received the attention and resources by police managers 
and leaders that it probably should have had because, in times of tight budgets and 
limited human resources, it was seen as an expensive luxury, the benefits of which were 
not clearly understood.  
Essentially, the intelligence process is no different from basic research. First, the problem 
is defined, then the data is collected, assessed and organized. It is analyzed and then 
disseminated to the appropriate departments or agencies. Yet, despite the simple logic of 
applying this model as the main ingredient in action plans against organized crime, its 
application still remains somewhat ambiguous, sporadic and inconsistent.  
There is a view prevalent in some police and enforcement circles that the role of criminal 
intelligence, if used at all, lies solely in a tactical operational sense, as a method to 
expedite bringing criminals to justice as swiftly as possible using intelligence to provide 
leads for the investigation and subsequent evidence gathering and prosecution of the 
criminal.  
But, once the criminal has been removed from the scene, little time is spent continuing 
with the intelligence process, particularly the essential activity of analysis to produce 
more tactical and even strategic intelligence about that criminal and his/her group and to 
identify links to other known or suspected criminals and groups still functioning. Police 
agencies are often more reactively driven and simply move on to the next operational 
event.  
Law enforcement bodies traditionally have gathered and stored data, often ad hoc, from a 
variety of sources, but have not expended resources toward the most critical area of 
intelligence work, that of analysis. This deficiency frequently has been identified by those 
who have examined the intelligence process over the years. In the McDonald 
Commission inquiry report, the Commissioners stated:  
the Security Service is weakest when it come to analysis . . .. We have met a number of 
Security Service staff with well developed analytical talents. The problem is that there is 
not enough of them, and in addition, those in middle management often lack the skills 
and experience to supervise them properly.13
The lack of analytical capability was not confined to the security intelligence field, but 
was also found wanting within the criminal intelligence community as well. A US 
government financed study found that police intelligence activities tended to continue as 
collection efforts, with little effective analytical work achieved.14  
The lack of solid analysis apparently has continued into the 1990s because in 1991, Bob 
Morehouse, Supervisor of the Organized Crime Unit for the State of California's 
Department of Justice stated:  
many law enforcement agencies in California have failed to progress much past the data 
collection and dissemination stages, having devoted little or no time to the analysis 
process even though most intelligence units have sent one or more of their staff through 
the California Department of Justice's intelligence analysis training program.15
Morehouse went on to state:  
most intelligence in California is tactical in nature and consists of creating link analysis 
charts and other visual investigative aids that are developed from intelligence data 
collected from specific cases. Unfortunately, few reports contain any hypothesis or an 
interpretation of events or forecasts. (emphasis added) 16
If tactical or operational intelligence is dealt with by a police agency in a systematic 
fashion through the ongoing processes of collection, assessment, recording, analysis and 
dissemination, the groundwork has been laid for the implementation of strategic 
intelligence. This will not only enhance and formulate a broader view of organized 
criminal events and trends, but can be an excellent management tool to examine other 
issues and events which may impact on planning and budgetary concerns, particularly 
making better use of scarce resources.17  
As an example, intelligence obtained from immigration and law enforcement personnel 
has identified many groups involved in large-scale smuggling of people into North 
America, with Indian, Pakistani and Latin American cases being well documented. 18 But 
illegal Chinese immigration shows the greatest growth, and with clear connections to 
Chinese criminal groups in China, Hong Kong and North America. The number of 
Chinese smuggling cartels has not only grown rapidly, fuelled by the financial rewards, 
but they are highly complicated and ingenious operations with circuitous transnational 
routes.19 Such large flows of illegal immigration coupled with legal migration can often 
have an unsettling effect on the receiving country's domestic politics. A substantial 
strategic intelligence picture of the threat from illegal immigration could be developed 
from a combination of sources: intelligence obtained from various tactical enforcement 
operations; and an analysis of historical and current political and economic events in 
China, gleaned from open sources. Together, these might help to identify the forces that 
are driving Chinese migration within China and externally throughout the world. Police 
and law enforcement officials are making some progress toward these types of 
assessments. Once so equipped they are then more adequately prepared to make sound 
and reasoned decisions.  
Organized crime has a long and varied history in many parts of the world, but 
traditionally it was seen as a domestic law and order problem. Over twenty-five years ago 
the Organized Crime Task Force of the President's Crime Commission (1967) noted the 
need for intelligence in the "war against organized crime." It declared that police 
departments in every major city should have a special intelligence unit solely to ferret out 
organized criminal activity.20  
THE CURRENT STATE OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PROVINCE 
OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  
In Canada, there are two national bodies responsible for the collection and analysis of 
criminal intelligence: the RCMP's Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID), and the 
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC). Both organizations have their head offices 
within RCMP Headquarters in Ottawa and representatives in field offices throughout the 
country, staffed by police and civilian personnel. CISC is an organization of combined 
Canadian law enforcement agencies, whose primary role is to provide facilities for the 
sharing of intelligence among all Canadian police forces. It is through this "network" that 
the criminal intelligence units of most major police agencies come together for the 
common purpose of fighting the spread of organized crime in Canada.21  
In British Columbia, policing services are provided by a federal force (the RCMP) and a 
number of independent municipal forces, the largest of which is Vancouver. The RCMP 
is divided into three jurisdictions, federal, provincial and municipal. The federal element 
is responsible for enforcing federal statutes such as Customs, Excise, Income Tax, 
Narcotic Control and Food and Drug Acts. The provincial element is under contract to 
the province to provide policing in the rural areas and in those municipalities not having 
their own police forces. The provincial and municipal police enforce the Criminal Code, 
which encompasses most of the offences which are considered organized crimes, with the 
exception of drug offences, which come under the Narcotic Control and Food and Drug 
Acts.  
Prior to the 1970s, there was little evidence and much less discussion on the existence of 
organized crime in Canada. It was believed that whatever existed was probably a 
"geographic spillover" from the United States.22 But in 1973, Dr. Malcolm A. Matheson 
prepared a report for the British Columbia Department of the Attorney General, which 
expressed great concern over the growing incidence of crime in British Columbia. 23 The 
report showed that crime had more than doubled in the period from 1962 to 1971, and in 
the case of crimes of violence, doubled again between 1971 and 1972.24 That activity was 
traced directly or indirectly to the influence of criminal activity in narcotics, 
loansharking, gambling, prostitution, extortion, theft rings, holdup gangs and commercial 
fraud. Given that recognition and documentation it was decided that a new approach be 
taken.  
In the Spring of 1974, the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU) was formally 
established in British Columbia to coordinate the efforts of police and other law 
enforcement agencies to research, investigate and prosecute organized criminals 
operating throughout the jurisdiction. CLEU is managed by a Policy Board, chaired by 
the Deputy Attorney General, which sets the priorities for the organized crime targets, 
establishes policy and direction and provides financial resources. CLEU has offices and 
personnel in Vancouver and Victoria and each is supervised by a Joint Management 
Team. There are two investigative arms composed of RCMP and municipal police 
members who mount joint force operations against specific targets. A rather unique 
feature of CLEU is its Policy Analysis Division, staffed by research officers and analysts, 
whose mandate it is to strengthen the legislative, regulatory and criminal law 
enforcement through the acquisition, dissemination and use of knowledge about 
organized crime. It also provides analysis of intelligence reports in support of operations 
and financial, analytical, technical, clerical, administrative and information system 
support.25  
THE GROWTH OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME  
Unfortunately, organized crime has spread far beyond the usual national and sub-national 
jurisdictional borders, and has become transnational in character, with international 
networks which recognize no boundaries. The threat from international organized crime 
is now declared by many authorities to be of such magnitude that it is essential that more 
emphasis and resources be placed in the criminal intelligence process. A 1993 study by 
the National Strategy Information Center, a Washington-based "think tank," concluded 
that international organized crime poses a threat to American interests that cannot be met 
by law enforcement alone. The study suggests that a new breed of international organized 
criminal is challenging governments throughout much of the world and is increasingly 
cooperating in large-scale criminal enterprise. The study stated that in the United States 
international organized criminals are a major influence behind drug-related violence and 
help to finance and promote financial fraud, alien smuggling, corruption and 
prostitution.26  
The authors of the report, Roy Godson, a Georgetown University professor and William 
Olson, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics matters, 
stated that, although US law enforcement agencies have had notable success combatting 
organized crime, the problems appear to be growing and the American response is 
fractured among a variety of agencies. The authors stated that "our government no 
government understands the magnitude of the threat posed by international organized 
crime."27 This concern about the threat posed by the rise in transnational criminal activity 
was echoed by then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director R. James Woolsey on 20 
April 1994, when he and other government witnesses were testifying at a US Senate 
hearing. He said that drug trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling and other 
criminal activity was spurring political corruption, terrorist violence and serious 
economic problems around the globe.28 Woolsey even stated that the issues are far from 
being exclusively in the realm of law enforcement; they also become a matter of national 
security. James C. Frier, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), testified 
that criminal groups from the former Soviet states are linking up with La Cosa Nostra 
and the Italian Mafia, Asian gangs and Colombian drug cartels. Frier quoted an estimate 
that crime groups have siphoned $500 million from the Russian economy. He said that 
the FBI have been paying increasing attention to Russian immigrants to the United States 
who are believed to be involved in criminal activities abroad.29 According to Louis J. 
Freeh, Director of the FBI, Russian emigré gangs working with La Cosa Nostra have 
been able to control the sale of more than 50 million gallons of gasoline per month in the 
US. Using fictitious corporations, the gangs have been able to draw off tax revenue 
estimated at $1 billion annually.30  
In a recent article on transnational criminal organizations (TCO's) and international 
security Phil Williams, Director of the University of Pittsburgh's Ridgway Center for 
International Security Studies, argued that "TCOs pose serious threats to both national 
and international security, and are extremely resistant to efforts to contain, disrupt or 
destroy them." 31 Changes in global politics and economics and the further development 
of the "global village" concept with its increased mobility of populations, rapid growth of 
international trade and sophisticated world wide financial transactions, not to mention the 
tremendous demands for goods and services throughout the world, has created many 
opportunities in abundance for illegitimate business enterprises and their criminal 
participants.32  
Criminals are used to operating outside the laws and regulations of any jurisdiction; for 
them, national boundaries are more of a nuisance than an obstacle and are readily 
circumvented.33 The size of the TCO's vary and are not necessarily hierarchial and rigid 
in structure. They range from the rigid Japanese Yakuza structure to the loosely arranged 
Chinese triads and youth gangs. With the exception of the Sun Yee On (SYO) and the 
14K, the Chinese organizations are loose groupings of criminals who have banded 
together at a particular time for a common purpose, such as the world wide distribution of 
thousands of counterfeit credit cards from Hong Kong. In 1993, world wide losses to 
counterfeit credit card fraud amounted to a reported $283 million.34  
The SYO, which has a significant presence in Hong Kong with links to people in higher 
places in the colony's socioeconomic structure, was reported in 1993 to be in an ongoing 
struggle involving frequent violent confrontations with the 14K, to maintain a 
stranglehold on the colony's entertainment industry.35 Triads and other Chinese criminal 
gangs have strong links throughout the world in the local Chinese communities, and these 
relationships have given them ideal surroundings to engage in the smuggling of illegal 
immigrants and heroin, extortion, gambling, loansharking and prostitution. Smuggling 
luxury cars from the US to mainland China, using sophisticated methods and overseas 
contacts in Hong Kong and the US, has been one typical criminal venture in recent years. 
36  
On the other hand, the Colombian cartels focus almost exclusively on drug trafficking, as 
do the Nigerian criminal groups. Russian criminal organizations are also emerging as a 
significant threat in fraud and money laundering. Phil Williams suggested that of 
particular concern is the increased Russian trafficking in nuclear material, with a reported 
200 smuggling operations taking place in 1993.37 Russian and German law enforcement 
officials stated that many of the reported thefts and attempted sales of nuclear materials 
involved gangs that were testing the market but did not yet have the goods. What they 
had was low grade uranium that needed refining to increase its market value. But FBI 
Director Freeh stated that the Bureau was aware of two kilograms of U-235 isotope 
missing for weeks from Russia's St. Petersburg area that had been "enriched to a weapons 
grade level." Apparently this amount is less than a third the amount needed to fashion a 
crude nuclear device. A larger amount was seized by police in Prague in December 1994, 
adding weight to concern about the illicit market for nuclear bomb-making material.38  
It is expected that illegal drugs, already a major worldwide economic activity, will 
become an even more significant commodity in the future. Heroin and opium seizures 
throughout the world have reached unprecedented levels. For example, in 1991 heroin 
seizures in Canada represented a 60 percent increase over the previous year.39 Williams 
suggested that with the unrest that has followed the end of the Cold War the proliferation 
of ethnic and regional conflicts, with sub-state groups challenging the authority of their 
states a growing number of malcontents are seeking weapons to further their goals. 
Criminal activity of various kinds, but particularly the drug trade, represents one lucrative 
avenue for generating the funds required for arms purchases. He goes on to observe that 
certain degrees of cooperation have developed between TCO's and certain nation states, 
or "rogue" elements within the states. From the perspective of intelligence analysis, these 
pacts of convenience, which meet the objectives of all parties, strengthen the link 
between criminal and national security threats. 40 This is most apparent in Peru, where 
temporary alliances of convenience have developed between the narcotrafficantes and 
the Sendero Luminoso insurgent groups.41  
The threat posed by transnational criminal groups must be seen in a new light, since 
society is not used to regarding "non state actors" as a major security threat. Olson and 
Godson assert that criminal organizations menace domestic institutions, the market 
system, the stability of friendly and allied countries and the lives and well being of 
Americans. Given the reported serious escalating criminal events in Russia and the 
organized criminal activities of Russian emigrés throughout the world, 42 should it be 
considered not only a law enforcement problem but a national security problem for 
Western democracies? If so, then perhaps security intelligence organizations, with some 
amendments to their legislated mandates should become more significant contributors to 
criminal intelligence in those cases where criminal and security problems overlap. For 
example, given CSIS' accumulated experience in analyzing Russian affairs, would it not 
be appropriate and useful to share that knowledge with police forces engaged in 
combating Russian transnational crime?  
Canada's "Proceeds of Crime" amendments, which came into force on 1 January 1989, 
have been a very effective tool in dismantling the enterprises of organized criminals. The 
legislation, which amended the Criminal Code, the Narcotic Control Act , the Food and 
Drug Act, and the Income Tax Act , provides criminal courts with the power to order the 
forfeiture of the proceeds of criminal activity following convictions of an "enterprise 
crime" or a "designated drug offence." The amendments also provide for the pre-trial 
"seizing" or "freezing" of the proceeds of crime by obtaining a "special search warrant" 
or a "restraint order." Further, the legislation creates the new offence of "laundering the 
proceeds of crime."43 The utility of this legislation was demonstrated in 1994, when the 
RCMP uncovered two large money laundering networks involving millions of dollars 
worth of drugs. In one investigation 558 kilograms of cocaine were seized, 26 people 
charged with trafficking and with laundering more than $100 million in cash. Some $65 
million of the money had been transferred to various foreign countries. During the 
investigation the RCMP froze more than 200 accounts in 29 financial institutions, some 
of them in Canada. 44  
As we approach the twenty-first century, experts, the media, and the public are debating 
the causes of the reported increase in criminality and violence. Police in all jurisdictions 
are being asked to expend greater resources to meet the demands of the public for safer 
streets and communities. At the same time, but much less visible and certainly less 
frequently covered by the media, sophisticated, professionally organized criminal 
organizations continue to flourish amid the distractions created by more visible law and 
order events that are the subject of so much media attention.  
The criminal intelligence community in Canada is fractured and disjointed, with national 
and regional efforts not being entirely coordinated. Granted, coordinated efforts must 
contend with the complicated array of federal, provincial and municipal police 
jurisdictional boundaries, but surely they are not insurmountable impediments. It is not 
sufficient to continue the collection process only. Analysis is absolutely essential. The 
security intelligence community has not been alone in the "collection only" side of 
intelligence. The criminal intelligence field has also concentrated on collection, with the 
analysis process being frequently neglected.  
Considerable duplication and rivalry is probably taking place given the parallel interests 
and responsibilities of Canada's two national criminal intelligence organizations, the 
RCMP's CID and the CISC. In the interests of cost effectiveness and operational 
efficiency some re-evaluation of organizational roles should occur. A single organization 
may best serve Canada's criminal intelligence needs.  
The CISC is ideally situated to take the lead in the collection and analysis of criminal 
intelligence in Canada. Mandated since 1966, it has the necessary infrastructure in the 
form of provincial bureaux located across the country. It has much of the required 
personnel and expertise and has already developed the necessary intelligence customers 
and contacts. Further, its computer system ACIIS II (Automated Criminal Intelligence 
System), has just undergone a major update and is scheduled to be on-line Canada-wide 
early in 1995. Thus, if the intelligence collection mandate is already in place, then the 
objectives and goals should be readily definable from the national to the provincial levels, 
taking into account local conditions and events. But, if CISC and the regional bureaux are 
to be the collection and analysis points, then it is incumbent on all RCMP federal, 
provincial and municipal divisions and detachments, as well as other provincial and 
municipal police departments to provide information to the provincial bureaux in their 
region. Since all of those law enforcement agencies and many others, such as 
Immigration Canada, Ports Canada Police, and Corrections Service Canada, are members 
or affiliate members of CISC, the organizational structures are in place. What is required 
from all those departments and agencies is a commitment to move toward a unified 
integrated criminal intelligence system to which all would contribute. To do otherwise 
would mean that our assessment of transnational crime and its threat to Canada will 
continue to be sporadic, piecemeal and not entirely accurate.  
Police agencies throughout the world are recognizing the need to coordinate and integrate 
their often financially-strapped resources. Shortly after being appointed to the position of 
US Attorney General, Janet Reno called for an integration of Federal law enforcement 
activities which resulted in a joint Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)/FBI database. DEA 
and FBI drug intelligence files would be merged into a single system. The FBI was 
undertaking a full commitment to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) which is 
managed by DEA, and in which all states and most federal agencies participate. EPIC 
provides intelligence on a real-time basis on the movement of drugs by land, sea and air 
throughout the world. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania will be responsible for strategic intelligence relating to drug trafficking 
organizations. Responsibility for the NDIC will rotate between the FBI and the DEA, 
with the US Marshals Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
required to contribute data systems and personnel. The Department of Defense and 
components of the Treasury Department were also expected to contribute. This 
coordinated effort was consistent with FBI Director Freeh's belief that duplication of 
efforts is untenable in this time of fiscal austerity.45  
In the United Kingdom, police and other law enforcement agencies have called for the 
creation of a "British version of the FBI to fight the triads and other forms of organized 
crime." In 1994, a Joint Action Group (JAG) was formed to help investigate international 
criminal groups. The JAG consists of senior government officials from 20 government 
departments and law enforcement agencies, including the Metropolitan Police, the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service, Customs and Excise, Immigration, Serious Fraud 
Office, Inland Revenue and the Gaming Board. 46 Although JAG is at present 
concentrated on London, where there is a high concentration of organized crime, the 
group could soon become national. 47 In March 1994, the British House of Commons 
Home Affairs Select Committee began an inquiry into organized crime in Britain. The 
committee will make recommendations on the possible changes in the structure of the 
police and other prosecuting bodies to give them greater power. Australia is currently 
exploring new methods at the federal level to integrate law enforcement responsibilities,48 
while German police authorities are seeking new ways to combat organized crime.49  
Police forces are operating in the new milieu of rapid communication, sophisticated 
computers, databases, and faxes. As well, police and enforcement agencies have liaison 
officers stationed in key cities abroad. Agencies such as Interpol provide a clearing house 
for information concerning the movement of criminals. So it is curious that police 
agencies, who have frequently voiced the wisdom of utilizing intelligence to "wage the 
war on organized crime," still are unable to determine the extent of the threat from 
organized crime. As noted at the outset, the explanation lies in part in the fact that the 
field of criminal intelligence has not received the critical attention and scrutiny it 
deserves from within, or without police agencies and departments.  
Given the myriad of criminal activity in our midst and the ever increasing demand by the 
public for police presence and action in their particular communities, it is not uncommon 
for a department's resources to be readily re-deployed to criminal activity that is neither 
organized nor major. But it is not surprising that the public genuinely would be more 
concerned about speeding cars, auto thefts and break and enters in their neighbourhoods 
than in the much less apparent organized crime. Many police agencies thus are frequently 
in a reactive mode with new events and criminal activity continually overtaking plans to 
develop effective intelligence assessments. This suggests that there might be a need for 
nationally and regionally financed organized crime departments, rather than municipal 
ones. Regardless of the level at which it develops, however, it is essential that any major 
police and law enforcement body have dedicated intelligence analysts, well-educated and 
trained innovative thinkers responsible for tactical analysis, who work closely with 
enforcement units to identify major criminals and their organizations for domestic and 
international customers.  
But of critical importance, even more so during times of limited financial and human 
resources, is the need to produce strategic intelligence, which has been called "a 
predictive management tool." 50 Strategic intelligence analysis involves the 
comprehensive examination of an assortment of disparate, incomplete and unfamiliar 
data, and requires considerable skill in developing hypotheses about events, trends and 
potential problem areas of criminal activity outside the normal course of a criminal 
investigation. But, there must be a commitment by management within police and law 
enforcement organizations to realize the value and place of each type of analysis in the 
field of criminal intelligence and to work toward that end. Some discussion, review and 
scrutiny by knowledgeable persons outside the forces themselves might exert a healthy 
influence on that process. Perhaps there is a need for the field and agencies of criminal 
intelligence to be subjected to the scrutiny of an oversight body, similar to CSIS' Security 
and Intelligence Review Committee, which would oversee targeting standards, 
effectiveness and efficiency. Can we rely on the organizations' internal auditors to 
perform those functions?  
It seems reasonable to expect that the combination of a growing threat from transnational 
crime throughout the world and reduced law enforcement budgets limiting the ability of 
police forces to cope with the increasing criminal problems,51 may bring about a renewed 
awareness and demand for answers to major organized crime problems. Likewise, the 
reduction of duplication, competition and rivalry among law enforcement agencies is 
finally being addressed in many jurisdictions, making way for the integration and 
amalgamation of resources.  
British Columbia's CLEU is one example of this process at work. It has moved 
progressively toward unifying intelligence and enforcement objectives against major and 
organized crime within their jurisdiction, but there still needs to be a strengthening of that 
integration process. The Criminal Intelligence Service British Columbia is now an 
integral part of CLEU and is expected to play a key role in the advancement of criminal 
intelligence. Personnel from Citizenship and Immigration and Revenue Canada (Customs 
and Taxation) have also been seconded to CLEU for investigative and analytical 
responsibilities. In fact, CLEU has frequently been mentioned in law enforcement circles 
as an excellent organizational model which has all the necessary ingredients to effectively 
combat organized crime.  
By utilizing various police and enforcement computer data banks, coupled with 
information gleaned from open sources, CLEU has greater potential to develop not only 
valuable and timely tactical intelligence in support of the operational police and law 
enforcement units but also valuable strategic assessments. These products, coupled with 
specific recommendations for policy changes, are valuable decision-making tools for 
senior government bureaucrats, policy makers and police managers.52 Likewise the 
report, Criminal Activity in the Business Immigration Program , which examined the 
extent to which criminals were using the business immigration method to enter Canada, 
gave a new insight into that potential problem area. 53 The report on Electronic 
Surveillance examined the causes and effects of diminished use of electronic surveillance 
by Canadian police forces between 1974 and 1992 and made specific recommendations.54  
CONCLUSION  
This article argues that the need for a sophisticated criminal intelligence organization in 
Canada is as of vital importance today as was the need for a security intelligence 
organization during the Cold War. It may not be sufficient simply to leave it only to law 
enforcement and intelligence bodies to debate and act upon that suggestion. Thus, the 
existing criminal intelligence process probably deserves the critical eye that security 
intelligence was given during the 1970s and 1980s by politicians, academics and other 
commentators. Ultimately, it might be all the better for it.  
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